Katherine Hayles: "What Does It Mean To Be Posthuman?"

This excerpt is unfortunately only the conclusion of Katherine Hayles' book, so I can only base any response to that particular section. That being said, I think it gives an adequate picture of what she was after in the rest of the book. The conclusion is aimed at appeasing fears of the advent of the posthuman. While there are a great many things I do not agree with in her argument I will start by giving a brief synopsis and then move on to my criticisms.

Hayles' objective in her conclusion is to show that the fear of the posthuman is unnecessary by showing the positive interpretations of the notion of being posthuman. This done so by offering intellectual and argumentative grounds for a positive outlook and thereby remoulding the definition of the term posthuman. Firstly, Hayles identifies why there is a fear: the fear of an intellectual variety that the definition of human will morph into something else, but more importantly the fear of an antihuman or apocalyptic instantiation of the posthuman. Meaning our replacement as a species by machines or our melding with machines to create some sort of cyborg. Either way, the view is negative because of the view that humans are superior and we as a species should not be overcome. Hayles then bases this fear in the liberal humanist belief of subject autonomy. That is the view, dating from the humanist Enlightenment, that humans are in control, we are superior to nature and this superiority gives us a clearly defined definition of what 'human' is (it is not machine, it is not cybernetic, it is a collection of particles forming a body of such and such average dimensions with reason, freedom and the ability to think as its hallmarks). Hayles thinks that this is untrue, certainly for the notion of posthuman but for other similar thinkers such as Harraway and others that she lists.

Hayles then points to this misconception of human autonomy as the root cause of this fear but also reverses it to give the posthuman a positive outlook. She argues that we do not think independently but think in conjunction with our surroundings and that the notion of "distributed cognition" shows that we are not the autonomous entities we thought. Indeed she says that computers, programs and machines in general do a lot of our thinking for us and the subjectivity that machines have was not given but emerged due to whatever external and internal circumstances prompted it to do so-mainly us creating and improving them. So machines think and judge and this thinking is used by humans. When we make a decision it is not by virtue of our autonomous will but by a conjunction of "thinking" of various entities, conscious and non-conscious alike. Therefore Hayles concludes that we do not have to fear the posthuman for it is not an end of the human as subject but the natural progression of our interaction with the complex system of distributed cognition that has evolved for thousands of years having machines and other natural entities as thinking subjects which we rely on. Rather the posthuman offers exciting chances of evolution for humans to broaden our capabilities. The definition of human it would seem Hayles is opposing is that of humans as separate, independent, autonomous, entities that are naturally superior and impose and dominate nature and she replaces it with humans as interdependent subjects in a complex network where thinking is done by a myriad of actors. It then is not a replacement of humans by machines but a more interdependent relationship that we will have with them through whatever form that may take (more integrated prosthesis, computer chips in our minds, judgement calls by robots on various matters, etc.) The human then evolves into the posthuman. Of note though is that Hayles also makes the claim that this may already be happening or has already happened because we have used tools for thousands of years and thought with them. As a result we are only progressing towards more integration with machines/tools but have always been 'posthuman' because of our interconnectedness to this distributed cognition.

Now I hope I have given an accurate description of Hayles arguments and propositions. While brief I have not created a straw man because the arguments I am criticizing are those in her conclusion not in the above summation.

I have numerous critiques of Hayles assertions and premises but her final conclusion and my own are actually the same. Firstly, the terror she describes at the advent of the posthuman I agree is unwarranted. I have high confidence in the ability of the human species and its innovation and ingenuity for it not to be wiped out or replaced any time soon (unless some sci-fi theory is realized and we are invaded by more intelligent and virustic aliens). The fear however is aimed towards mechanical supremacy over humanity. But this as well I find unlikely. I do not wish to digress too much but the idea of AI as generally seen in popular culture is not only a long way off but I think unlikely in general. If there were to be some sort of intelligent machine it would have to be more of a cyborg variety, say like the Borg from Star Trek. It would require human characteristics, most notably brain functions, to think and have consciousness like ours. However Hayles does not discuss this for she remains in the realm of the abstract. While I do agree that there is a fear of the "posthuman" and that it is unwarranted I disagree with the premise she posits as the cause of this fear. That is the liberal humanist view of the human subject's autonomy. While I agree that we are not totally free and are our actions are causally determined to a large extent, we still have a will able to synthesize these causes and see the possibilities open to choose. A view much like Schopenhauer's as outlined in The World as Will and Representation (Book III). We have the ability to think, to process information, to synthesize it and to draw judgements based on our thoughts. While this information does come from a variety of sources, such as machines and computer programs, the cognitive ability comes solely from us. Machines do not think nor do they have any sort of consciousness akin to our own. They process information based on a mathematical equation and spit it out without "understanding" what it is they are processing. Hayles gives Hutchins' example of Searle's Chinese Room thought experiment to underscore the "distributed cognition". While I agree that it is because of our environment that we have the information that we think with it is our ability to think that enables any cognition. One must flip this criticism onto machines to see that they do not think. In their entirety anything resembling "thought" comes from an amalgamation of data that they receive from the environment, largely input by humans. Hayles seems to use "thought" in a rather loose way, only referring to "distributed cognition" so it may turn out that she does not think that computers think in actuality but rather I believe she thinks that cognition arises out of a complex network of actors all contributing to this process. While this may be true I prefer to think of it as a complex network, but one that humans are at the centre of because it is our judgement and cognitive ability that makes it possible. Remove humans and there would be no cognition of a complex variety (although there may still be cognition in the form of other life forms but that is debatably not thinking)

I would now like to turn to the subject of machines themselves. Hayles analysis of them seems to liken them to subjective consciousnesses similar to humans because they aid in our thinking and they perform functions that we no longer have to but still make use of. Indeed they often perform them better than we do. But this is forgetting where they come from. Machines and other tools are a product of the human mind. We have created them to help maximize our own efficiency and they have certainly accomplished that task. The main thing though is that without us not only would they not exist, but as I just mentioned there would be no cognitive ability. As Ayn Rand has one of her characters say in Atlas Shrugged: “I thought...of the men who claim that machines condition their brains. Well there was the motor to condition them, and there it remained as just exactly what it is without man’s mind-as a pile of metal scraps and wires, going to rust.” (page 745, Atlas Shrugged) This sentence expresses that which Hayles and I agree on: that machines condition humans and that we enhance them with our progress but we differ in that I think that we are still the dominant factor. Without us they would fall to rust. Perhaps like I mentioned, in the future there will be artificial intelligence reminiscent of say The Matrix capable of sustaining itself. But I doubt it and currently wish to discuss mechanical developments to the present day.

What Hayles is doing that I do agree with is her attempt to appease fears against the posthuman. Now I think I differ in what the posthuman will look like and what it is defined by, but what we have in common is that the future of humanity and technology is not only positive but exciting. Although Hayles view of where the fear comes form is different then my own the prospects of humanity are enthralling. In the short span of several thousand years we have developed vastly complex technology that accomplishes tasks from the most trivial (doorknob) to the most complex (remote controlled mining robots). It is our greatest achievement as a race and our best quality, one that bestows on us an ability to conquer nature and proliferate our species. The continued improvement of our technology does not herald the end of humanity but its enduring existence. Hayles gives the view that we have always been posthuman, and this is certainly one way to look at it, but I prefer to see it as humanity and its technology. The former creating and relying on the latter and the latter requiring the former for existence but simultaneously aiding in the former’s own existence.  I this view Hayles and I can also agree that it is a complex interdependency and co-relationship that will continue to evolve for the betterment of both. The pedantic argumentation of thought and consciousness is actually secondary and almost irrelevant to the concretely observable evolution in this complex relationship.

Directed at my fellow peers: Hayles mentions Joseph Weizenbaum's assertion that the capacity to make a judgement should be left as a matter of an ethical principle, to humans alone. Do you agree? What are the ethical implications of ceding more and more functions to computers and other technology? Is there a possibility of us losing our humanity because we relinquish the ability to form a judgement of a given nature? I have supplied a link to the Ayn Rand Institutes' webpage for those who are interested in learning more about her. She is a philosopher that is generally despised and disregarded by the academic community and for that reason I believe she has merit. Also I added a link to a forum of Computer Ethics articles, essays and discussions to go along with my questions

http://www.aynrand.org/site/PageServer?pagename=index

http://www.southernct.edu/organizations/rccs/oldsite/resources/teaching/teaching_mono/bynum/bynum_human_values.html

Michel Foucault: 'Of Other Spaces (Heterotopias)'

"Des Espaces Autres", a relatively unknown work by Foucault, has risen to promise recently in a variety of fields due to its wide-ranging and insightful content. Despite being the work in which Foucault gives a thorough account of his notion of heterotopias, which is unto itself a worthwhile concept, it is essentially an analysis of space in its general and subjective sense. I agree with most of what Foucault says about heterotopias, despite them being like my discussion of medium theory below; that is, a very broad category. However their usefulness and applicability in my opinion is more valuable as theoretical material (compared to medium theory). I will therefore go over the notion of heterotopias as outlined by Foucault and then tie it together with the preamble of the article which is a discussion of the concept of space.

So for Foucault a heterotopia is an 'other space'. He is conscious that the criteria he gives are not scientific, having a condescending view of the term. Regardless, it is equally well that he does not attempt a method labelled explicitly scientific. Moving on, a heterotopia is a space, both cultural and material which can be found physically yet not actually be there. It is an escape, an apparent attempt at utopia (which Foucault concedes is unreal and unrealizable) which excludes normal space. This normal space in my opinion can often be regarded as public space but it is also defined by its function of exclusion. This exclusion is not necessarily an exclusion of people but also of materiality, concepts, other functions of society and culture. He gives clearly his six principles of heterotopias: they are present in every culture; they can have one, multiple or changing functions; they can bring together several incompatible spaces or things; they are capable of juxtaposing time across space; they manifest a system of apertures that is both accessible and exclusive from other spaces; and lastly they are relational to all other spaces. Foucault gives numerous examples, the brothel, the boat, the garden, the cemetery, the honeymoon suite, etc. He also points to the mirror as being heterotopic and simultaneously the closest approximation of a utopia that can be found. This discussion of utopias is interesting and warrants a greater look since it ties in to some other discussions that have taken place during the course.

A utopia, a perfect world, is for me by definition impossible. Foucault is in agreement in that regard. In view of the various debates surrounding the concept of perfection, the notion that something can be perfect is difficult to conceive. In other analyses of space (specifically online space) postulations have been made that our tendency to 'enter' these virtual worlds is essentially an attempt to find a utopia; it is an escape from our physical reality. Examples such as World of Warcraft were given, however I think they equally apply to any fictional narrative such as novels, movies, in some manner the online experience itself. We are perhaps intrinsically dissatisfied with our present space (i.e. circumstances, life) so we search for a better one with the view of finding the perfect space (read utopia). Foucault's point then is that since we cannot find our own utopia these other spaces we escape to are heterotopias, always based on the six principles he elucidated. It is furthermore not simply a personal escape either. Foucault gives cultural escapes as well. Places that society as a whole uses as an exclusion so they must not be explicitly subject to it. Foucault gives the honeymoon, the brothel, as such places with a specific demarcation between public and private. Heterotopias however are not necessarily utopian in a strict sense, but reflect a utopia based on function. To be clear, I mean that the cemetery is not considered a utopia in that it is the perfect space. This would be the view of a specific subjective consciousness. I refer rather to the cemetery as an attempt at the perfect space for a specific function, in its proper case a space for the dead removed from the rest of society. In that way heterotopias are an attempt to reconcile the myriad views of perfection help by everyone by demarcating places that can be said are close to perfect for a specific purpose. Another example would be the brothel. Some would think that frequent and random sex would be part of their version of a utopia while others would not. In this way heterotopias offer a "perfect" space for one specific function. It is a slightly polemical digression with interesting consequences which I do not wish to go into here, but we can then see how if all heterotopias are a perfect place for a specific function then the totality of heterotopias would be a utopia consisting of perfection of all functions equally a totality of human existence, but I am departing the subject I wish to focus on.

Again however I believe this theory to have the fault of being too broad (to some extent, depending upon one's purpose). It can perhaps be argued that almost anything can be considered a heterotopia and if so what then are they and what can be the benefits of realizing they exist? I see this more as a possible critique, I do not myself hold it because I think their merit lies in their explanation of the human search of the utopian. That is to say, the theory explains a purely conceptual problem and was likely not intended as a major social change.

Foucault's preamble is a discussion of space so as to set the stage for heterotopias. However he also makes the odd remark that the 19th-century was mainly interested in history. We know Foucault had a great interest in history since childhood, but I think his rejection of his century (the 20th) as not interested in history and interested in space predominantly is a mistake derived from being present in one's own historicism and for that reason he did not see recent events as history. That being said I think humans will always have a keen interest in historical matters. However I digress.

Foucault describes space as relational, much like his notion of power. And as Kezia pointed out, heterotopias are not outside of power relations despite being removed from normal space. Now Foucault says that space has a history in Western thought, yet he only goes back as far as the Middle Ages. He cites religious places and spaces for the peasantry as formative of a hierarchy of spaces, yet I think it is equally plausible to take that as far back as antiquity and the Hellenistic period; but I may be focusing on the pedantic here. In the preamble we see Foucault's distinctly Kantian influence: the reduction of principles to a priori conceptions of space and time. Foucault dismisses time as passé, of another era (although I think this is pointedly a rebuke against the phenomenological emphasis of time over space) and focuses instead on space saying it is that which occupies humanity at present. Foucault differs from Kant on his conception of space itself though, saying here that "The site is defined by relations of proximity between points or elements...". This is in reference to Galileo's implications of space as infinite. Further he says that "we do not live in a kind of void, inside of which we could place individuals and things." (a reference to Kant's second argument for space as synthetic a priori in the Trasncendental Aesthetic in the Critique of Pure Reason) How Foucault differs from one of his greatest teachers however is whereas Kant had an absolute conception of space Foucault has a relational conception of space which permeates all his works. Kant held, like Newton, that space was an absolute thing (in-itself) and could exist without anything in it. Foucault believes space to be relational in that space is defined by the relations of the objects within it to each other and therefore any limits on space would be defined by these relations. We see this resurface in his formulation of heterotopias, specifically in the sixth principle. With this metaphysical system in mind it becomes clear what Foucault is looking to do. That being that because space is relational we can understand space based on the relations that compose it. By doing so we have a greater grasp of what space is and what characteristics it has. He then arrives at his notion of heterotopias, which is an analysis of these relations of spaces with each other and their following implications and characteristics.

We see then that this short article touches upon three different yet important points: the metaphysical conception of space; the status of utopias and their significance; and heterotopias as the human manifestation of a drive for utopia in a subconscious sense. All of this in view of the new, virtual space of the internet, unknown to Foucault. My question to my peers then, despite being the obvious one, requires an in-depth answer: Is the internet a heterotopia? It may equally be considered in aggregate with the parts having multiple relations and demarcations of spaces within the internet as a whole, but also while offline. I have provided several links to material I believe to be relevant or of interest: a discussion of Kant's transcendental aesthetic as espoused in the Critique of Pure Reason from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (another good synopsis and discussion of this subject is Bertrand Russell's chapter on Kant in his History of Western Philosophy); a link to the Stanford entry on Foucault; and lastly a link to a Google Image search of Swiss/French architect Le Corbusier's architectural drawings. This I included because the general consensus is that his drawings embody utopia, however as per this discussion, never realized it in application.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-spacetime/

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/foucault/

http://www.google.com/images?um=1&hl=en&biw=1133&bih=604&tbs=isch:1&sa=1&q=le+corbusier+drawings&aq=f&aqi=g1&aql=&oq=

Tim

Guy Debord: 'Separation Perfected'

This is my second (critical) response, this time to Guy Debord's 'Separation Perfected' in Society of the Spectacle (Paris 1967). I will begin again by putting the work in context: 1967, that odd decade of the 60's which heralded so much social change. Guy Debord's writings helped inflame the Paris revolts of 1968, particularly Society of the Spectacle, and although less prominent today, the most well known work of this film critic, philosopher, social commentator and poet is still in print. He was also the founder as we know, of Situationist International, a group which wished to provoke social change through a fusion of art ad politics. Needless to say it did not last.

As with most of the postmodern/post-structuralist thinkers, Debord's writing is sufficiently dense and it takes several readings to find his main point. That being said, my attention was drawn by peers to his phrase "Everything that was directly lived has moved away into a representation." (thesis 1) Although arguably this can be used as a summation of his line of thought in this work, I do not find it very clear, nor does Debord use 'representation' and its derivatives often throughout the chapter. I prefer the last aphorism; "The spectacle is capital to such a degree of accumulation that it becomes an image." (thesis 34) Here we can see his main topic of discussion, the 'spectacle', being equated with capital. Now we need to take capital in a rather broad, Marxist sense, referring to money, material goods and the transactions of these commodities. Debord then is saying that his notion of spectacle which he sees as permeating every facet of social existence is not only derived from but is the notion of capital accumulation and the capitalist system. Debord tends to repeated himself several times, since all the theses are interrelated. I wish to go through his main points.

His idea of the spectacle must be flushed out: that our social lives have become devoured by the notion of the spectacle to such an extent that it controls us and we live in a separated world never feeling at ease because we are isolated viewers of the world; life has become a representation, an image. Debord says that the spectacle isn't simply imagery or media, although these are aspects and instances of, the spectacle. Rather he says that the spectacle is a "relation among people, mediated by images" (thesis 4) It is therefore a world view (Weltanschauung) that has been realized by the mass distribution of the capitalist system and the inherent methodological production mechanisms that come with it. Separation is intrinsic in such a system as the means of production are alienating, those means which become widespread and the goal of the system (to produce); but the further it develops the more abstract and distorted the system becomes, so much so that "the goal is nothing, development everything." (thesis 14) Therefore with such a system in place, founded on an inherent isolationism, the more it expands themore isolated its members become. Likewise, since what is produced is material, or if not material based on the transactions of material things with a common medium, i.e. money, and materiality is best reached with the visual field then we have a permeation of our culture with the visual. Capitalism and the visual (the spectacle) therefore grow side-by-side.

Those are the more economic aspects of Debord's view. Resulting from those we have social consequences. The separation of the subject from life. Life itself becomes represented by the spectacle, that image of capital which is produced en masse by our economic and political system. The most glaring aspects of which are the mass media, which Debord claims are in no way neutral, but controlled by the administration (read bourgeoisie) to reinforce on one level, the current administration, and on another level the system itself. Furthermore, with the subject simultaneously being the producer he is ultimately removed from life as life has become constituted by the produced, the spectacle, isolating the subject. "This is why the spectator feels at home nowhere because the spectacle is everywhere." (thesis 30) Lastly before I go into some brief criticisms of Debord's view, he makes a brief attack on philosophy, sighting its apparent weakness in having a ingrained view of the visual in its analyses. The result of the spectacle on philosophy (and by extension the world) is that it has rendered everything speculative by its self-creation of reality. Philosophy is not the answer to religion, as the spectacle has given religion a tangible base. Neither can it solve the social problems arising form the spectacle for, to quote Marx, "the philosophers have only interpreted the world, the point is to change it." Hence why Debord starts the Situationist International to effectuate social change via action.

Heretofore I have attempted to give a sympathetic synopsis of Debord's views as I have interpreted them.  However I do not agree with all that he postulates, albeit a lot of it is sensical and I am of the same opinion. I agree with our obvious isolation as individuals and our separation from the 'Other' even though our lives are occupied mainly by the social. Such isolation can be said to be anxiety causing, and reminds me of Deleuze and Guattari's Anti-Oedipus: Schizophrenia and Capitalism. Indeed many of Debord's ideas are reminiscent of other thinkers: obviously Marx and Lukacs, but in some ways Foucault and his notion of power relations: "When analyzing the spectacle one speaks, to some extent, the language of the spectacular itself in the sense that one moves through the methodological terrain of the very society which expresses itself in the spectacle" (thesis 11) Also one can see Nietzsche in there as well: "But the critique which reaches the truth of the spectacle exposes it as the visible negation of life, as a negation of life which has become visible." (thesis 10) The problem I do have with Debord though, is the completely abstract way he discusses his notion of the 'spectacle' for he uses it with numerous functions almost interchangeably and sometimes it is not clear what the spectacle is, for he seems to say it is everything. If that is indeed the case, then it would appear to be some form of idealism which for various reasons I do not agree with, although it is not necessary to go into detail now. It almost seems that his discussion of the spectacle is so abstract and so removed from the phenomenological reality of the subject that it may have no worth as a discourse. However I do realize that that is his point on philosophy's impotency, hence why Debord wished to usher in change with action. That is my other great point of contention, that philosophy appears to be useless in the way of religion and causing change. Due to philosophy many people become atheists, and while philosophy itself is not a substitute for religion (generally) it can arguably be said to lead the way away from religion. Secondly, while philosophy on its own has no power to effectuate change in a material sense, it can do so by manifesting its opinions in a subject and thereby inducing change by the proliferation of its views. However those are perhaps only pedantic points on an otherwise excellent piece of writing. As it is required, I will pose questions to my peers: What is the role of philosophy in the world, taken in a mass cultural sense? Particularly does it have any tangible effect on say the internet or other media systems, for example this very discussion via the internet? Or is it simply a dogmatic and archaic practice no longer useful in the resent historical moment?

I have a link to a page on Marx from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, and another to a comment on Debord's film forays and supplementary material. I apologize but the second one is in French only.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/marx/#2.2

http://www.larevuedesressources.org/spip.php?rubrique12

Tim

Mark Federman: 'What is the Meaning of The Medium is the Message?'

This post is a (critical) response to Mark Federman's 'What is the meaning of The Medium is the Message?', which can be found here:

http://individual.utoronto.ca/markfederman/article_mediumisthemessage.htm

Firstly, it is important to put the work in context. Federman's article has an explanatory purpose, aimed at explaining Marshal McLuhan's dogmatically famous quote, "the medium is the message". This particular phrase comes from McLuhan's 1964 work Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man. It has long been debated what he meant by it, as McLuhan was notoriously well known for being obscure. The misunderstanding of this phrase is what Federman is addressing:

     Often people will triumphantly hail that the medium is "no longer the message," or flip it around to proclaim that the "message is the medium," or some other such nonsense. McLuhan meant what he said; unfortunately, his meaning is not at all obvious, and that is where we begin our journey to understanding.

Federman sympathetically explains McLuhan's famous phrase by breaking it down. For him, 'medium' is the extension of the human body which McLuhan discusses, that being virtually anything that we may use: a tool, a TV screen, a book, language, etc. It is a medium in the sense that it causes a 'message'. This message is similarly a broad category, being any change in in our environment (culture, society). However as Federman says, we often miss these changes by only regarding the superficial changes we see overtly. His example is of the news; most people would think that the message of the news (the medium) is the stories they are recounting but it is in fact the change reflected in the public/society induced by that story. In this sense then, the story itself is also a medium, another of Federman's points. On the whole we can see that McLuhan's messages are almost common sensical. Yes we ca see, if not instantaneously, then over a generation, our societies and cultures change. And yes, certainly the theatre is an extension of ourselves, a medium in a myriad of ways, the most obvious being an entity given to conveying a story in a visual and somewhat realistic manner. However it is the non-obvious that apparently McLuhan was after, thereby becoming 'McLuhan media' as Federman puts it. From The Medium is the Massage McLuhan gives television (coming to widespread predominance in mass culture in the 1960's) this attention as a medium, as it reshaped the participatory ability of the public in "...Freedom Marches, in war, revolution, pollution, and other events..." (page 22) Therefore the message was the change in public participation caused by the television medium and its effects on society.

Heretofore I have agreed with Federman's analysis, as what McLuhan meant is understandable if one takes the time to read through McLuhan's texts and consult secondary literature (like Federman's article). However, I wish to now point out some more negative aspects of this theory and explanation. Federman quotes McLuhan on the 'nature', 'essence' and 'character' of a medium as being that which is the most important aspect, rather then its content or form and that further the message derived from a particular medium is what reveals these. However both are ambiguous on what exactly the 'nature' of a medium is, how it is understood from the message it gives and why specifically such an 'essence' (substituting for nature or character) is so important. Take television as an example, what is the nature of television? It's ability to convey visual representations, auditory sense datum and information from around the globe? Or is it that it is available to everyone (questionably), or is it that television is different from prior types of information communication? It may all of these, or none of them. Also, it may be that none of these are important as regards the medium of television (although I think McLuhan would give an explanation containing some of these qualities). But take something not so obvious, such as one's wallet (a result of looking around the room) It is the product of a human mind, in concept and material composition, and since the above definition of medium includes all such things, what is the essence of a wallet? How has it changed the way our society operates or how culturally we think? Of course one can easily give a hatchet-job explanation, which is exactly the point. The category of medium is ridiculously broad (including almost everything) in turn reducing to the thought that McLuhan's work is common sensical. Therefore, I must content myself with McLuhan's goal being to only point out things that most people overlook.

Something I do not completely accept however, is Federman's brief discussion of language. He says that language is also a medium, one that we use to convey our thoughts to other people. However I agree with most analytic language philosophers of the twentieth century that we cannot have thoughts without language. Hence the typical inability of people to remember when they were very young. Federman continues saying that speech is a way to bring our "sensorially-shaped minds out to the world". I do not agree that they are sensorially shaped, but language shaped. However this slightly pedantic digression still assumes language as a medium, however perhaps the most complex one. Otherwise I agree with Federman's interpretation of McLuhan's phrase 'the medium is the message'. As it is required, a question for others to ponder: with Federman's explanations of 'the medium is the message', is the category of mediums so broad so as to render any analysis of McLuhan media meaningless since anything can be a medium? If so, do we have any predictive power over the messages (changes) that will come from these mediums?

A supplementary link to an essay buy a McLuhan scholar on the same subject, but I find her examples more lucid:

http://www.ccfi.educ.ubc.ca/publication/insights/v10n02/html/rideout/rideout.html

Tim

First Blog Post

Hello anyone who reads this,

This blog's purpose is to relay my opinions and comments on an online course, Philosophy and the Internet. All of my responses will be posted here. This Blogger thing is ridiculously complex to use.

Tim